The Insurrection in Mesopotamia 1920
The Insurrection in Mesopotamia 1920 - by Lieutenant General Sir Aylmer Haldane
- available online via link above
times: When the insurgency of 1920 broke out, the British Army of Mesopotamia was commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Aylmer Haldane, a veteran of campaigning on four continents, including command of a corps on the Western Front in 1918. His memoir, The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920, published only two years after the event, is remarkable - not least that today it is quite obviously more remarked upon by commentators than actually read. It was reported that Rumsfeld's aides scoured second-hand bookshops for a copy (then going for up to $250 apiece by all accounts) to draw what lessons they could as the Coalition began facing up to the new version of insurrection in the summer of 2003. Evidently they did not have much luck.
As the reprinted edition of Haldane's book relates, it took more than six months and a cost of 2,300 British and Indian lives to repress the rebellion, in which more than 8,000 Iraqis were killed. British columns were ambushed and attacked at night, the railways that they relied on were ripped up, with the commando tactics employed by T. E. Lawrence on the Hejaz three years before. The worst setback for Haldane was the ambush of the column of the 2nd Battalion the Manchester Regiment, in their encampment on a march for water out of Hillah, on July 24, 1920. The Manchesters were forced to make a fighting withdrawal under darkness, and in the melee nearly 200 British and Indian soldiers were killed. The Adjutant, Captain G. S. Henderson, won a posthumous Victoria Cross, for actions remarkably similar to those in which Johnston Beharry won his VC last year.
Haldane's memoir has been given the dubious status of a primer of lessons learned about Iraq that should have been heeded today. More interesting are the lessons Haldane did not learn. His conclusion to the book is reflective and modest. It was a near-run thing, and he asks pertinent questions about the adequacy of the forces available to him, their utility and sustainability - issues very much alive today for the Coalition. His tactics were often brutal, though apparently not brutal enough for Colonel A. T. Wilson, then deputy Civil Commissioner, the exponent of the "shock and awe" doctrine of the day. Houses were blown up, tribal chiefs hanged, large fines handed down, and arms and munitions confiscated by the tens of thousands. Haldane suggested that in the future more use should be made of the RAF to make intimidating overflights of villages, and drop bombs. The recommendation was taken up, and has a legacy to this day. Link
Hat-tip to savage minds
- available online via link above
times: When the insurgency of 1920 broke out, the British Army of Mesopotamia was commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Aylmer Haldane, a veteran of campaigning on four continents, including command of a corps on the Western Front in 1918. His memoir, The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920, published only two years after the event, is remarkable - not least that today it is quite obviously more remarked upon by commentators than actually read. It was reported that Rumsfeld's aides scoured second-hand bookshops for a copy (then going for up to $250 apiece by all accounts) to draw what lessons they could as the Coalition began facing up to the new version of insurrection in the summer of 2003. Evidently they did not have much luck.
As the reprinted edition of Haldane's book relates, it took more than six months and a cost of 2,300 British and Indian lives to repress the rebellion, in which more than 8,000 Iraqis were killed. British columns were ambushed and attacked at night, the railways that they relied on were ripped up, with the commando tactics employed by T. E. Lawrence on the Hejaz three years before. The worst setback for Haldane was the ambush of the column of the 2nd Battalion the Manchester Regiment, in their encampment on a march for water out of Hillah, on July 24, 1920. The Manchesters were forced to make a fighting withdrawal under darkness, and in the melee nearly 200 British and Indian soldiers were killed. The Adjutant, Captain G. S. Henderson, won a posthumous Victoria Cross, for actions remarkably similar to those in which Johnston Beharry won his VC last year.
Haldane's memoir has been given the dubious status of a primer of lessons learned about Iraq that should have been heeded today. More interesting are the lessons Haldane did not learn. His conclusion to the book is reflective and modest. It was a near-run thing, and he asks pertinent questions about the adequacy of the forces available to him, their utility and sustainability - issues very much alive today for the Coalition. His tactics were often brutal, though apparently not brutal enough for Colonel A. T. Wilson, then deputy Civil Commissioner, the exponent of the "shock and awe" doctrine of the day. Houses were blown up, tribal chiefs hanged, large fines handed down, and arms and munitions confiscated by the tens of thousands. Haldane suggested that in the future more use should be made of the RAF to make intimidating overflights of villages, and drop bombs. The recommendation was taken up, and has a legacy to this day. Link
Hat-tip to savage minds
posted by exoplanet at 3:00 PM
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