U.S.: A Real Nuclear Threat
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy:
Dangerous and Counterproductive
Despite the end of the Cold War more than a decade ago, U.S. nuclear weapons policy remains mired in Cold War thinking. The Clinton administration ignored its historic opportunity to reverse decades of dangerous and provocative nuclear weapons planning, and in its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Bush administration has taken steps backwards by increasing the roles for nuclear weapons in U.S. policy. The Bush NPR calls for the development of new, more "usable" nuclear weapons; for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states; and for reducing the time required for the United States to resume nuclear weapons testing.
Under the recent Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the "Moscow Treaty," the United States and Russia will each reduce their deployed nuclear weapons to roughly 2,000 by December 31, 2012, at which point the treaty will expire. Each country will be free to retain as many warheads in storage as it wishes, where they can be maintained for rapid redeployment.
Thus, the United States plans to store many thousands of warheads indefinitely. In addition, it will maintain its 2,000 deployed warheads on alert, able to be launched within a matter of minutes of a decision to do so. There is only one conceivable purpose for the United States to maintain 2,000 nuclear warheads on alert: to target Russian warheads. As a consequence, many of Russia's warheads will also remain on alert, giving rise to a real risk of accidental and inadvertent launch. There is no reason to believe that such a launch would be small; this danger has now superceded that of a deliberate U.S.-Russian nuclear war.
These policies also undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which serves as an important barrier to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries.
The 182 non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT agreed to extend the treaty for an indefinite duration in 1995 based on the assumption that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would soon be finalized; the Bush NPR makes it clear that the administration will not ask the Senate to ratify the treaty and that the United States may even seek to resume nuclear testing.
Moreover, the underlying premise of the NPT, as spelled out in Article VI, is that in exchange for other countries forgoing the development of nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapon states will pursue nuclear disarmament. Yet the Bush NPR assumes that the United States will deploy two thousand warheads and store several thousand more indefinitely. Read more
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