They just got a different tool to use than we do: They kill innocent lives to achieve objectives. That's what they do. And they're good. They get on the TV screens and they get people to ask questions about, well, you know, this, that or the other. I mean, they're able to kind of say to people: Don't come and bother us, because we will kill you. Bush - Joint News Conference with Blair - 28 July '06

Saturday, October 08, 2005

Destroying Iraq in order to save it

Globalguerrillas: CREVELD'S PREDICTION

Iraq's insurgency is made up of dozens of different groups, each with their own motivation for fighting. Under this big tent, no one group is dominant. Even the foreign Jihadis under Zarqawi are but a single digit percentage of the total insurgency. Despite this fragmentation, the insurgency appears to act as a single entity: it probes for weakness, improves its methods, and mounts campaigns. The major reason for this is that Iraq, unlike most of the places we have fought insurgencies, is a relatively modern urbanized environment. It has a large cell phone grid, a modern highway system, and Internet connectivity. People have the ability to both communicate and travel quickly throughout the entire country. This high level of connectivity makes possible for the insurgency to combine and recombine into new organizational networks that are similar to what we only see in advanced western settings.

This infrastructure has allowed the insurgents to leapfrog to a new organizational form that is more survivable, inclusive, and innovative than traditional hierarchies (I call this open source insurgency). It appears that the US military has finally taken actions to mitigate this advantage. It announced yesterday that it had bombed (with precision strikes) eight bridges across the Euphrates River inside western Iraq to stop insurgents from using them. As the US army spokesman said:

"One of the vulnerabilities of this insurgency is freedom of movement. We took out portions of these bridges to deny terrorists, foreign fighters and insurgents the capability to cross north to south or south to north across the Euphrates River."

This is the first major attempt to slow down the insurgency's rapid decision making loops and as a localized tactic, it may even enjoy some success. However, strategically, it is political and moral kryptonite. It is also a sign that the coalition has become in the words of Martin van Creveld as weak as the insurgents (it needs to destroy Iraq in order to save it). Read more